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Prospective  negative  cognitions  are  suggested  to play  an important  role  in  maintaining  anxiety  disor-
ders  and  major  depressive  disorder  (MDD).  However,  little  is known  about  positive  prospective  mental
imagery.  This  study  investigated  differences  in  prospective  mental  imagery  among  27  patients  with
anxiety  disorders,  24 patients  with  MDD,  and  32  control  participants.  Measures  of  both  deliberately
generated  and  intrusive  imagery  were  completed.  Results  indicated  that  both  patients  with  anxiety  dis-epression
nxiety
ental imagery
rospective cognition
ntrusions
lashforwards
orders  and  those  with  MDD  provided  poorer  vividness  ratings  for  deliberately  generated  prospective
positive  scenarios  compared  to  the control  group.  Patients  with  anxiety  disorders  showed  a greater  ability
to vividly  generate  imagery  for prospective  negative  scenarios  than  both  patients  with  MDD  and  con-
trol  participants.  Finally,  both  clinical  groups  reported  greater  levels  of intrusive  prospective  imagery  of
personally-relevant  events  as  compared  to the  control  group.  The  current  ﬁndings  underline  the  necessity
to target  prospective  positive  mental  imagery  in  treating  MDD  and  anxiety  disorders.. Introduction
An extensive body of research has demonstrated support for
ognitive theories indicating that cognitions can play a signiﬁcant
ole in the development and maintenance of major depressive dis-
rder (MDD) and anxiety disorders (Craske et al., 2009; Gotlib &
oormann, 2010). Cognitions are conceptualized as taking the form
f verbal thoughts or mental images (Beck, 1976) although the focus
as traditionally been on verbal thoughts. In both depression and
nxiety, faulty cognitive processes include difﬁculties in shifting
ttention from negative material and biases in memory, although
here may  be some differences between the two clinical syndromes
ith regard to these cognitive processes (Craske et al., 2009; Gotlib
 Joormann, 2010).
Cognitive biases as seen in depression and anxiety are likely
o not only affect the processing of current and past experiences,
ut also the processing of prospective-oriented material, i.e., cog-
itions relating to the future. There is accumulating evidence that
he same neural pathways are activated when imagining the future
s when remembering the past (Byrne, Becker, & Burgess, 2007;
chacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). According to the concept of the
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“prospective brain” (Schacter et al., 2007), our ability to imagine
and predict potential future events is based on stored informa-
tion in our memory. In line with this model and given the fact that
depression is associated with biases in the processing of both posi-
tive and negative memories (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), one would
expect depression to be associated with a bias in the processing of
both positive and negative prospective-oriented material. Research
on possible memory biases in anxiety has yielded mixed ﬁndings
(Craske et al., 2009), thus prohibiting clear predictions with regard
to prospective-oriented information processing in this disorder.
With regard to prospective positive and negative cognitions
in depression and anxiety, MacLeod, Tata, Kentish, and Jacobsen
(1997) have hypothesized that prospective cognitions may  follow
the same pattern as positive and negative affect as postulated by
the tripartite model (Clark & Watson, 1991). The tripartite model
proposes that negative affect is shared by both depression and anx-
iety, whereas absence of positive affect is speciﬁc to depression. In
this model, positive affect is seen as a dimension of pleasurable
engagement, level of energy and concentration, whereas negative
affect is thought of as a dimension of unpleasurable engagement
and subjective distress. These dimensions are theorized to include
broad affective, cognitive, and motivational characteristics (Clark
& Watson, 1991). MacLeod and Byrne (1996) and MacLeod et al.
Open access under CC BY license.(1997) argue that affect is directly related to cognition and that pos-
itive and negative future-related cognitions may  best be perceived
as two separate dimensions of experience, differentially associ-
ated with depression and anxiety. Consequently, as depression is
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ssociated with increased negative affect and reduced positive
ffect it is also expected to be related to increased negative
xpectancies and decreased positive expectancies. In contrast, anx-
ety should only be associated with increased negative expectancies
hrough the high negative affect component.
Research into prospective mental imagery has taken two  main
pproaches. The ﬁrst is the examination of the deliberate (as
pposed to involuntary) generation of speciﬁc prospective images
n response to set cues such as short sentences in the laboratory.
acleod, Rose, and Williams (1993) used an adaptation of the Auto-
iographical Memory Task (typically used to study overgeneral past
emory in depression) where participants are required to gener-
te as many positive and negative future events as possible. In this
dapted ﬂuency measure of future thinking, participants are pre-
ented speciﬁc time periods in the future and asked to generate
xperiences they are looking forward to and not looking forward
o, for example, next year or in ﬁve years time. Time periods are
resented verbally, one at a time, and participants are given a time
imit of one minute to generate and say aloud as many responses
s they can. The items generated by participants are written down
y the researcher. An example of a deliberately generated positive
uture event reported by participants might be “taking a vacation,”
hereas an example of a negative future event might be “get-
ing a disease.” Although deliberately generated in the laboratory,
hese same events may  also be experienced as involuntary future
mages. Number of responses generated per condition (i.e., future
ositive experiences vs. future negative experiences) counts as the
utcome measure. Macleod et al. (1993) have found this ﬂuency
easure of future thinking to be effective in eliciting personally
elevant responses. In a study with suicidal patients and nonde-
ressed controls, Williams et al. (1996) reported that deﬁcits in
eing able to recall speciﬁc past memories were associated with
eﬁcits in generating speciﬁc future images. MacLeod and Byrne
1996) further found that both anxious and anxious-depressed
articipants showed greater anticipation of negative experiences
hat might happen to them in the future than the control group
sing this task. Furthermore, as expected, only anxious-depressed
articipants showed lower anticipation of positive future-directed
xperiences. In a study investigating clinical depression and anxi-
ty, MacLeod et al. (1997) found that participants with depression
enerated less positive prospective experiences than control par-
icipants. However, contrary to their expectations and contrary to
he tripartite model, participants with anxiety (i.e., not those with
epression) generated a greater number of prospective negative
xperiences compared to controls.
An alternative to the assessment of ﬂuency has been to assess
he vividness of imagery for prospective events generated in
esponse to a set list. Using the Prospective Imagery Task (based on
acLeod & Byrne, 1996), Stöber (2000) investigated the vividness
f prospective positive and negative mental imagery in non-clinical
nxiety and depression. Examples from this set list are “you will do
ell on your course” for a positive prospective event or “you will be
 victim of a crime” for a negative prospective event. In this study by
töber, only depression (and not anxiety) showed a unique relation-
hip with impoverished vividness of positive prospective events.
urthermore, only anxiety (and not depressed mood) was corre-
ated with enhanced imagery for negative prospective events. Using
he same measurement of the vividness of prospective events in a
tudy with non-clinical participants with high or low levels of dys-
horia (depressed mood), Holmes, Geddes, Colom, and Goodwin
2008) reported that high levels of dysphoria were associated with
ower vividness of positive (but not negative) prospective images.
hese ﬁndings are also contrary to predictions based on the tripar-
ite model or the model of the prospective brain. Taken together,
redictions based on the tripartide model (Clark & Watson, 1991)
nd the model of the “prospective brain” (Schacter et al., 2007) haveisorders 25 (2011) 1032– 1037 1033
not entirely been able to explain the association between prospec-
tive imagery and depression and anxiety. In accordance with these
two  models, MDD  has indeed been associated with lower vivid-
ness of positive prospective events (Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele,
2008; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al., 1997; Stöber, 2000).
Further, several studies have reported that anxiety is associated
with a higher vividness of negative prospective images (MacLeod &
Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al., 1997; Stöber, 2000). However, contrary
to predictions based on the models, several studies have reported
that MDD  is not related to higher vividness of negative prospective
images (Holmes, Lang, et al., 2008; MacLeod et al., 1997; Stöber,
2000).
The second approach has been to explore intrusive involun-
tary prospective imagery for real-world events, i.e., images of the
future which come to mind unbidden rather than those generated
in response to set cues in the laboratory as in the studies discussed
above. The Impact of Future Events Scale (IFES; Deeprose & Holmes,
2010) was designed to measure the impact of “pre-experiencing”
in the form of intrusive prospective, personally-relevant imagery,
assessed through a series of self-report questions. A positive corre-
lation between current depressive symptomatology and IFES Total
Score has been observed in a non-clinical sample, with a mild-
dysphoric group showing signiﬁcantly higher Total IFES scores than
a non-dysphoric group (Deeprose & Holmes, 2010). Total IFES score
has also been associated with risk for bipolar disorder in a non-
clinical sample (Deeprose, Malik, & Holmes, 2011). These results
raise the possibility that intrusive prospective imagery may  be of
relevance in depression as well as anxiety.
A growing body of recent research has documented the asso-
ciation between imagery and mental disorders (Brewin, Gregory,
Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Hirsch & Holmes, 2007; Holmes &
Hackmann, 2004; Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Mental imagery has
been shown to evoke greater emotional responses than language-
based representations (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; Holmes &
Mathews, 2010; Holmes, Mathews, Mackintosh, & Dalgleish, 2008).
Furthermore, research suggests that prospective imagery affects
future behavior. Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, and Slemmer (2007) as well
as Vasquez and Buehler (2007) have demonstrated that people are
more motivated to accomplish future behavior and also to actu-
ally conduct the behavior in question if they imagine its successful
completion from a third-person perspective rather than a ﬁrst-
person perspective. Holmes, Crane, Fennell, and Williams (2007)
have shown that simulation of future events using imagery may
be particularly concerning from a clinical perspective if the action
is negative, such as in the case of “suicidal ﬂashforwards” imagery
(Crane, Shah, Barnhofer, & Holmes, in press).
The aim of the current study was to explore the relation-
ship between positive and negative prospective mental imagery
in patients with MDD  and patients with anxiety disorders in com-
parison to healthy participants using established paradigms from
experimental psychopathology research. First, we assessed vivid-
ness for deliberately generated mental images in response to a set
list of prospective positive and negative events using the Prospec-
tive Imagery Task (Holmes, Lang, et al., 2008; Stöber, 2000). Ratings
were also obtained for arousal as well as the estimated likelihood
that each event would occur in the future. Second, we investigated
the impact of intrusive, prospective imagery of personally-relevant
real-world events among patients with MDD and anxiety and in
comparison to healthy participants using the IFES (Deeprose &
Holmes, 2010).
In accordance with ﬁndings reported above (Holmes, Lang, et al.,
2008; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al., 1997; Stöber, 2000),
we predicted that for deliberately generated images, only partici-
pants with MDD  (i.e., and not those with anxiety disorders) would
report lower vividness of positive prospective images as com-
pared to healthy participants. Furthermore, we  predicted that only
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articipants with anxiety disorders (i.e., and not those with MDD)
ould report higher vividness of negative prospective images than
ealthy participants (Holmes, Lang, et al., 2008; MacLeod & Byrne,
996; MacLeod et al., 1997; Stöber, 2000). Finally, we hypothesized
hat both participants with MDD  and those with anxiety disorders
ould report a higher impact of intrusive, prospective images of
ersonal events than the control group (Deeprose & Holmes, 2010).
. Methods
.1. Participants
The samples consisted of 24 patients with MDD, 27 patients with
nxiety disorders, and 32 healthy control participants. Patients
ith MDD  or anxiety disorders were recruited from outpatient
sychiatric clinics of the University of Frankfurt. Diagnoses were
etermined by qualiﬁed clinicians using the Structured Clinical
nterview for DSM-IV axis for I disorders (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, &
illiams, 1996) and Axis II disorders (Pfohl, Blum, & Zimmerman,
997). The SCID was used in assessing the clinical groups only.
atients were included if they met  criteria for MDD  or at least one
nxiety disorder. Exclusion criteria were acute suicidality, depres-
ive disorder with psychotic symptoms, bipolar disorder, organic
sychiatric disorders, substance-abuse disorders, schizophrenia,
chizoaffective disorders, and borderline personality disorder. An
dditional exclusion criterion for the group with anxiety disorders
as meeting criteria for MDD. On the other hand, anxiety disorders
ere an exclusion criterion for the MDD  group.
In the MDD  group, 70.8% of the participants were diagnosed
ith MDD  as the only diagnosis. The rest of the sample had one
omorbid diagnosis (three patients were diagnosed with a comor-
id somatization disorder, two with a comorbid pain disorder, one
ith bulimia nervosa, and one with an avoidant personality disor-
er). Participants with MDD  had a mean age of 42.0 (SD = 11.3) and
8.3% of them were female.
In the group of anxiety disorders, participants were diag-
osed with the following primary diagnoses: panic disorder with
14.8%) or without (33.3%) agoraphobia, generalized anxiety dis-
rder (22.2%), social phobia (7.4%), posttraumatic stress disorder
7.4%), agoraphobia (3.7%), obsessive-compulsive disorder (3.7%),
nd speciﬁc phobia (7.4%). The majority of participants (66.7%) had
o comorbid disorder. Participants with a comorbid disorder were
iagnosed with either another anxiety disorder (22.2% of the total
ample) or another comorbid diagnosis (11.1% of the total sample:
ne with bulimia nervosa, one with hypochondriasis, and one with
arcissistic personality disorder). The mean age of participants in
he anxiety group was 35.1 (SD = 9.6) and 74.1% were female.
Individuals in the control group were recruited through adver-
isement and were matched to the patient groups with respect
o age and gender. Potential control participants were included
fter having been screened with the Hospital Anxiety and Depres-
ion Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) and provided that they had
o prior history of MDD  or anxiety disorders. Within this sample,
he average age was 38.4 (SD = 13.1) and the percentage of female
articipants was 62.5%.
This study was approved by the medical ethics committee of the
niversity of Frankfurt. Written informed consent was  provided by
ll participants.
.2. MeasuresThe Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond &
naith, 1983) was used to assess anxiety (7 items) and depres-
ion (7 items). Authors of the HADS have recommended a score of
bove 10 for probable clinical anxiety or depressive disturbance,isorders 25 (2011) 1032– 1037
respectively. The HADS has demonstrated good reliability and
validity properties (Herrmann, 1997). In the current study, the
internal consistency reliability of the HADS anxiety subscale
(˛ = 0.85) and depression subscale (  ˛ = 0.88) were satisfactory.
The Prospective Imagery Task (PIT; based on MacLeod & Byrne,
1996; Stöber, 2000) was  used to measure imagery for 10 posi-
tive and 10 negative prospective events. As in Holmes, Lang, et al.
(2008), subjects were asked to rate the vividness of prospective pos-
itive events (e.g., “You will have lots of energy and enthusiasm”)
or negative events (e.g., “Someone close to you will reject you”)
on a 5-point scale (1 = no image at all; 5 = very vivid). However, in
addition to the vividness, in the current study, the PIT was mod-
iﬁed to also include arousal associated with prospective images
and the estimated likelihood that prospective images will occur
in the future. Levels of emotional arousal were assessed in line
with the study’s focus on emotional disorder in order to explore
whether participants in the clinical groups would report higher lev-
els of emotional arousal associated with the vividness of positive
or negative prospective imagery compared to controls, with whom
the measure has been predominately utilized. Participants were
ﬁrst instructed to read a particular future scenario (e.g., “Some-
one close will reject you”) and to imagine the scenario happening
to them. Then they were asked to rate the vividness of the sce-
nario in question (“How vividly can you imagine this scenario?”).
Then, they were asked to rate the arousal associated with each
the scenario in question (“How emotionally aroused do you feel
while having this image”). Finally they were asked to calculate how
likely it is that that particular scenario might occur in future (“How
likely is it that this scenario might happen to you in the future”).
Rates of arousal and estimated likelihood were also rated on a 5-
point scale. In the current study, the internal consistency of the PIT
positive subscale was  ˛ = 0.89 for the measurement of vividness,
 ˛ = 0.87 for the measurement of arousal, and  ˛ = 0.89 for the mea-
surement of likelihood. The internal consistency of the PIT negative
subscale was  ˛ = 0.83 for the measurement of vividness,  ˛ = 0.87 for
the measurement of arousal, and  ˛ = 0.84 for the measurement of
likelihood.
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, Clark,
& Tellegen, 1988) was  administered to separately measure both
positive and negative affect. In the current study, the short version
of the PANAS consisting of ﬁve items for positive affect and ﬁve
items for negative affect was  used (Thompson, 2007). Items are
scored on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from not at all (1) to
extremely (5). Participants were asked to anchor their responses to
feelings during the last two  months. The internal consistency reli-
ability in the current study was  ˛ = 0.81 for the subscale of positive
affect and  ˛ = 0.84 for the subscale of negative affect.
The Impact of Future Event Scale (IFES) (Deeprose & Holmes,
2010) was used to assess the impact of intrusive prospective,
personally-relevant imagery. To encourage participants to respond
on IFES in relation to idiosyncratic future events, participants were
ﬁrst asked “Please identify three future events which you have been
thinking about by imagining over the past seven days (e.g., positive
or stressful life events). For each event, please indicate whether
your imagining of it was positive or negative.” Thus, participants
could respond with solely positive or solely negative events, or a
combination of both. Participants then responded to 24-items with
the instructions “Below is a list of comments made by people about
imagining events in the future. Please read each item, indicating
how frequently each comment was true for you during the past 7
days due to imagining the future”. Items included “Pictures about
the future popped into my  mind,” “I tried not to think about the
future” and “I had waves of strong feelings about the future.” Each
item was  anchored on a 5-point scale.
In scoring the IFES, the primary outcome variable is IFES Total
Score which is the summation of responses to the 24-items. The
N. Morina et al. / Journal of Anxiety Disorders 25 (2011) 1032– 1037 1035
Table  1
Mood measures (HADS and PANAS) and mental imagery measure (PIT and IFES) for each group separately, with post hoc-comparisons between pairs of groups.
1. Anxiety (n = 28) M (SD) 2. MDD  (n = 24) M (SD) 3. Control (n = 32) M (SD) ANOVA F(2,80) Pairwise post hoc-test p-value
1 vs. 3 2 vs. 3 1 vs. 2
HADS: anxiety 13.3 (4.3) 9.5 (4.4) 6.9 (3.5) 18.47 <0.001 <0.05 <0.01
HADS: depression 9.6 (3.7) 12.9 (3.5) 3.5 (2.2) 64.31 <0.001 <0.001 <0.01
PANAS: positive affect 13.5 (3.8) 14.2 (3.8) 17.9 (2.5) 14.91 <0.001 <0.001 0.47
PANAS: negative affect 15.5 (4.8) 13.3 (4.0) 8.7 (3.0) 23.56 <0.001 <0.001 0.04
PIT  positive
Vividness 3.1 (0.8) 3.1 (0.7) 3.8 (0.6) 8.79 <0.01 <0.01 0.99
Arousal 3.4 (0.7) 3.5 (0.8) 3.4 (0.7) 0.08 0.70 0.93 0.78
Likelihood 2.7 (0.7) 2.7 (0.7) 3.5 (0.7) 13.59 <0.001 <0.001 0.78
PIT  negative
Vividness 3.6 (0.7) 3.2 (0.6) 3.2 (0.8) 3.06 0.03 0.96 0.04
Arousal 3.9 (0.7) 3.5 (0.7) 3.2 (0.9) 4.18 <0.01 0.31 0.09
Likelihood 2.8 (0.8) 2.5 (0.5) 2.2 (0.6) 6.75 <0.01 0.15 0.06
IFES  Total Score 1.8 (0.7) 1.8 (1.0) 1.0 (0.4) 11.29 <0.001 <0.001 0.97
IFES  Negative Events 1.5 (1.0) 1.42 (0.8) 0.8 (0.7) 5.14 <0.01 0.01 0.79
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pote: HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; PANAS = positive and negativ
-values  in bold < 0.05.
econdary outcome variable is the number of negative events per
ndividual, which is summed to create “IFES Negative Events”, i.e.,
he total number of events rated by the participant as negative.
he total number of events provided by each participant is three.
FES has good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87) and
dequate test re-test reliability (r = 0.73) (Deeprose et al., 2011). The
nternal consistency of the IFES in the current study was   ˛ = 0.90.
. Results
.1. Baseline characteristics
The three groups were comparable in terms of age,
(1,80) = 2.47, p = 0.17, and gender, X2(2, 83) = 1.54, p = 0.46.
Mean scores of each group on the depression and anxiety sub-
cale of the HADS are shown in Table 1. Participants in the group of
nxiety disorders reported signiﬁcantly higher anxiety scores than
oth participants in the MDD  group and control participants. Likely
ise, participants with MDD  had signiﬁcantly higher depression
cores than both participants with anxiety disorders and control
articipants.
There were signiﬁcant differences between the groups with
espect to positive and negative state affect. Compared to the
ontrol group, the two clinical groups reported lower scores of pos-
tive affect and higher scores of negative affect. Among the clinical
roups, participants with anxiety disorders reported signiﬁcantly
igher scores of negative affect.
.2. Mental imagery measures
Table 1 presents results for prospective mental images gener-
ted on the PIT. With regard to positive prospective scenarios (PIT
ositive), both clinical groups reported a poorer ability to vividly
magine prospective positive events as compared to the control
roup.1 The clinical groups also rated the likelihood of occurrence
f positive events in the future as less likely than the control group.
here were no differences among the groups with respect to arousal
ssociated with prospective positive imagery.As to prospective negative images (PIT negative), there were
o differences between individuals with MDD  and control par-
icipants. However, participants with anxiety disorders showed a
1 An Ancova while using HADS depression subscale as a covariate still revealed
 signiﬁcant difference between participants with anxiety disorders and healthy
articipants.t schedule; PIT = Prospective Imagery Task; IFES = Impact of Future Event Scale; all
greater ability to vividly imagine prospective negative scenarios
than participants with MDD  and control participants. Additionally,
participants with anxiety disorders rated the likelihood of occur-
rence of negative scenarios in the future as more likely than control
participants. Finally, participants with anxiety disorders reported
higher arousal associated with prospective negative scenarios than
control participants.
Concerning intrusive prospective imagery, both clinical groups
reported higher IFES Total Scores, reﬂecting greater impact of
intrusive prospective imagery of personally-relevant events as
compared to the control group (IFES Total Score; Table 1). Both clin-
ical groups reported a higher proportion of IFES Negative Events
compared to controls. Within the clinical groups, there were no
differences with regard to IFES Total Score or IFES Negative Events
(Table 1).
4. Discussion
To date little research has examined prospective mental imagery
in anxiety and depression, despite its clinical relevance to cogni-
tive behavioral formulations of these disorders. In line with our
predictions, we  showed ﬁrst that depressed patients, compared
to controls, had impoverished imagery vividness when asked to
deliberately imagine positive future events. This ﬁnding is clini-
cally compelling as it suggests even if depressed people are asked
to try to imagine a positive future, it is seen less clearly.
Second, as predicted results showed that patients with anxi-
ety disorders (and not those with depression) imagined negative
prospective images more vividly than the healthy participants. This
is consistent with clinical reports by anxious patients being assailed
by vivid imagined future threats. Importantly, this suggests that if
given a trigger, such as a negative warning in a newspaper, peo-
ple with anxiety would be susceptible to seeing the worst outcome
more clearly and intensely than non-anxious individuals.
Our ﬁnal key ﬁnding concerned intrusive, involuntary personal
imagery rather than deliberate imagery. As predicted, data revealed
that both patients with anxiety and depression reported a higher
impact of intrusive, involuntary prospective images of personal
events than the control group. This suggests that patients experi-
encing both disorders are more prone to unwanted images of events
in the future springing to mind unbidden.To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to explore the
role of mental imagery in prospective cognition using a convergent
battery of measures to examine both deliberately generated and
intrusive real-world mental imagery in clinical samples of MDD
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nd anxiety disorders. A further strength is the use of age and
ender-matched controls. However, the study has also several lim-
tations. The cross-sectional design of the study does not allow for
onclusions of causal relations between depression and anxiety
nd prospective mental imagery. The anxiety disorder sample was
omposed of patients with different anxiety disorders. However,
here may  be differences between individuals with different anx-
ety disorders with respect to prospective imagery. Future studies
re needed to examine this issue. Further, no inter-rater reliability
egarding the use of the SCID was assessed though all interviewers
ere conducted by qualiﬁed clinicians. Finally, use of medication
t the time of assessment was not assessed and thus it could not
e measured whether medication might have inﬂuenced prospec-
ive cognitions. Future studies may  wish to select a wider range
f imagery measures, including laboratory based tasks rather than
uestionnaire measures and also measure whether psychopfar-
aca inﬂuences prospective cognitions.
Nonetheless, these ﬁndings offer new insight into the poten-
ial role of mental imagery in prospective cognition in patients
ith MDD  or anxiety disorders. As in prior research (Holmes, Lang,
t al., 2008; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996; MacLeod et al., 1997; Stöber,
000), patients with MDD  reported lower scores for vividness
f prospective positive scenarios than control participants. Fur-
hermore, patients with MDD  did not report higher vividness of
egative prospective images than control participants, also a ﬁnd-
ng consistent with previous literature (Holmes, Lang, et al., 2008;
acLeod et al., 1997; Stöber, 2000) and in contradiction with pre-
ictions based on the tripartite model (Clark & Watson, 1991) or the
urrent conceptualization of the prospective brain (Schacter et al.,
007). However, it has been reported that observer-perspective
mages are common in individuals with MDD  (Kuyken & Howell,
006; Moulds & Williams, 2007). Based on ﬁndings that observer-
erspective is associated with reduced emotional arousal (Holmes
 Mathews, 2010), it might be that in our study patients with
DD  may  have used observer-perspective more often than patients
ith anxiety disorders and thus have damped vividness of negative
vents. Yet, future research should test this hypothesis while look-
ng at perspective in relation to prospective images among patients
ith MDD  and anxiety disorders.
Our result that patients with anxiety disorders reported more
ivid images of negative prospective events than healthy partic-
pants is also in line with prior studies (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996;
acLeod et al., 1997; Stöber, 2000). However, the outcome that
atients with anxiety disorders also reported impoverished vivid-
ess of positive prospective events is seemingly contradictory to
revious results. MacLeod and Byrne (1996),  MacLeod et al. (1997)
nd Stöber (2000) found that anxious participants did not show
ower levels of positive future experiences. However, as mentioned
bove, the ﬂuency measure of prospective thinking as utilized by
acLeod and Byrne (1996) and the PIT used here are intended to
easure different outcomes (ﬂuency, i.e., number of prospective
vents vs. vividness of prospective scenarios). Thus, our ﬁndings can
ather be seen as an assessment of another dimension of prospec-
ive cognitions (i.e., imagery rather than just verbal thought).
lthough we used the same measure of prospective imagery as
töber (2000) we studied a clinical sample compared to the non-
linical analogue population used previously which may  account
or the disparity in results. Finally, the difference with regard to
ositive prospective images remained signiﬁcant between patients
ith anxiety disorders and healthy participants even after control-
ing for current depression symptomatology.
Our exploratory examination of the arousal of generatingmagery on the PIT did not reveal any differences between clin-
cal groups and controls with regard to positive prospective
mages. Further, patients with anxiety disorders reported signiﬁ-
antly higher levels of arousal associated with negative prospectiveisorders 25 (2011) 1032– 1037
cognitions than control participants. This indicates that impover-
ished vividness of positive prospective images is not related to
reduced emotional arousal associated with these images. However,
enhanced vividness of negative prospective images was related to
enhanced emotional arousal. Patients with anxiety disorders who
reported enhanced levels of vividness of negative images than con-
trols also reported higher levels of emotional arousal associated
with these images than controls. The estimated likelihood that
prospective images will occur in the future was associated with lev-
els of both positive and negative prospective images. Both patients
with MDD  and anxiety disorders rated the likelihood of occur-
rence of positive prospective events as less likely than the control
group as they also rated impoverished vividness of these prospec-
tive events than controls. Similarly, patients with anxiety disorders
rated negative prospective events as more likely than controls.
These results are in line with previous related ﬁnding. Warren,
Zgourides, and Jones (1989) reported that perceived likelihood of
negative outcomes predicted avoidance behavior in patients with
anxiety disorders. MacLeod et al. (2005) found that perceived likeli-
hood of positive events was  associated with levels of hopelessness.
Vincent, Boddana, and MacLeod (2004) reported that parasuicide
patients estimated personal goals as less likely to be attained.
Our ﬁndings underscore implications for cognitive theory and
cognitive behavioral therapies (CBT) of depression and anxiety
regarding mental imagery. First, if a deﬁcit in positive imagery is a
deﬁcit, a clinical implication might be promoting stronger deliber-
ate positive imagery of the future may  be of beneﬁt in depression
and anxiety disorders (Hackmann, Bennett-Levy, & Holmes, 2011;
Holmes, Lang, & Deeprose, 2009; Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, &
Mackintosh, 2006). As this was not an intervention-based study,
we did not assess the impact of promoting deliberate positive
imagery per se, but our ﬁndings suggest that future research in this
area would be fruitful (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Lang, Blackwell,
Hamer, Davison, & Holmes, submitted for publication). Positive
imagery can be boosted in a number of ways from imagery work
developing an idiosyncratic and positive image (e.g., one image
of a positive self-nurturer in compassionate mind work Gilbert &
Irons, 2004; Lee, 2005) to encouraging systematic training to be
able to better imagine numerous positive future events (Blackwell
& Holmes, 2010; Lang et al., submitted for publication).
Our results indicate that deliberately generated prospective
negative images may  be more closely related to anxiety than to
depression but that both MDD  and anxiety may  be associated with
intrusive prospective imagery of real-world events. While intru-
sive negative imagery has long been described in anxiety (Hirsch
& Holmes, 2007; Holmes & Hackmann, 2004), intrusive negative
imagery has only more recently been described as a clinical fea-
ture in depression (Patel et al., 2007; Williams & Moulds, 2007).
Targeting negative intrusive imagery in depression in the way it
is targeted in anxiety may  open new treatment options (Brewin
et al., 2009; Kandris & Moulds, 2008). Techniques that could be used
to target negative imagery include imagery rescripting (Holmes,
Arntz, & Smucker, 2007) as well as simple exposure (Kandris &
Moulds, 2008). Targeting negative imagery has already been piv-
otal in the development of (CBT) for post-traumatic stress disorder
where individual hotspots and ﬂashbacks are a focus (Ehlers &
Clark, 2000) and social phobia which included behavioral experi-
ments to challenge socially phobic imagery (Clark et al., 2006). This
targeting of negative imagery may  usefully be extended to mood
disorders (Holmes, Geddes, Colom, & Goodwin, 2008). Further,
boosting positive imagery of the future provides a novel experi-
mentally driven target for treatment innovation in depression.Conﬂict of interest
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